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Social security faces a major long-term funding crisis. A 38 or greater
percentage increase in the system's tax rate is needed to meet benefit
payments on an ongoing basis. Tax increases of this magnitude or compa-
rable benefit cuts would significantly worsen social security's treatment of
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postwar Americans. This paper uses CORSIM (a dynamic micro simulation
model) and SOCSIM (a detailed social security benefit calculator) to study
this treatment. The study finds that Americans born in the postwar period
will, under current law, lose roughly 5 cents of every dollar they earn to
the OASI program in taxes net of benefits. Measured as a proportion of
their lifetime labor incomes, the middle class are the biggest losers, surren-
dering about 7 cents per dollar earned. But measured in absolute dollars,
the rich lose the most. Out of every dollar that postwar Americans contrib-
ute to the OASI system, 67 cents represent a pure tax. The system treats
women better than men, whites better than non-whites, and the college-
educated better than the non-college-educated. While the system has
been partially effective in pooling risk across households, it offers postwar
cohorts internal rates of return on their contributions that are quite low-
1.86 percent. This is half the real rate currently being paid on inflation-
indexed long-term U.S. government bonds. If taxes are raised or benefits
cut by the amounts needed, under intermediate assumptions, to achieve
intertemporal budget balance in the OASI program, postwar Americans
wifi end up receiving a 1 percent real return on their contributions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Social security is facing a severe long-term financing problem. The prob-
lem is much deeper than is either commonly understood or publicly
acknowledged. According to unpublished "intermediate" estimates by
Social Security's actuaries, a 4.7-percentage-point hike in the current
12.4-percentage-point old age, disability, and survivors (OASDI) tax rate
is needed to pay for social security benefits on an ongoing basis. This tax
hike is twice as large as the rate social security's Trustees Report says is
needed to achieve long-term actuarial balance. The discrepancy is easily
explained. The Trustees Report uses a truncated projection horizonone
which makes social security's long-term finances look much better than
they actually are.
The size of this requisite tax hike is even more remarkable when one
considers that it was calculated using "intermediate" demographic and
economic assumptions. Under more pessimistic, but arguably more real-
istic assumptions, more than a 6-percentage-point immediate and perma-
nent payroll tax hike is needed. if such tax hikes are not enacted in the
short term, even larger tax hikes wifi be required in the long term.
Alternatively, social security benefits wifi have to be dramatically re-
duced. Such tax increases or benefit cuts would significantly raise the
significant net taxes being paid to Social Security by postwar Americans.
This paper first examines the lifetime net old age and survivors insur-Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans111
ance (OASI) benefitsOASI benefits less OASI taxesto be paid to
postwar generations based on current law, ignoring the tax hikes or
benefit cuts needed to maintain the system's solvency. It then shows
how social security's treatment of postwar Americans worsens when
alternative fiscal adjustments are made. The paper also compares the
lifetime net benefits of successive postwar cohorts to determine whether
younger cohorts are getting a worse deal than older ones. Equally impor-
tant, it compares social security's treatment of the rich, middle-class, and
poor members of each of these cohorts. This intra-cohort analysis of the
system's progressivity is also conducted on a lifetime basis. The paper
also considers the degree of insurance protection provided by the OASI
program. It does so by considering the variability of individuals' lifetime
incomes before and after the application of OASI taxes and the provision
of OASI benefits. Understanding this insurance function is important,
since the losses that postwar generations incur through the saving por-
tion of OASI may be offset by gains through its provision of insurance.
Finally, the paper considers the real internal rate of return that postwar
cohorts earn on their OASI contributions.
Although the paper considers the OASI system in great detail, it
leaves out the disability insurance (DI) portion of social security. It also
ignores the taxation of social security benefits under federal and state
income taxes. Both of these omissions lead to an understatement of
social security's redistribution from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor.
Our tools are two: CORSIM (a dynamic micro simulation model) and
SOCSIM (a detailed social security benefit calculator). We use these pro-
grams to calculate lifetime net OASI benefits for baby-boomers and their
children. CORSIM generates a representative sample of lifetime earnings
and demographic trajectories for Americans born or to be born between
1945 and 2000. SOCSIM determines the OASI benefits and taxes received
and paid by the CORSIM sample. The paper then uses these benefits and
taxes to (1) compute the lifetime net benefits (benefits less taxes) paid to
different cohorts and subgroups within cohorts of the baby boomers and
their children and (2) measure how well OASI pools risk across cohort
members by reducing the variance of lifetime income.
CORSIM starts with a representative sample of Americans alive in 1960. It
then "grows" this sample demographically and economically. Specifi-
cally, it ages, marries, divorces, fertilizes, educates, employs, unemploys,
re-employs, retires, and kills original sample members and their descen-
dants over the period 1960 through 2090. SOCSIM uses completed lifetime
demographic and economic experiences to determine OASI retirement,
spousal, widow(er), mother, father, children, and divorcee benefits as
well as OASI taxes. It does so taking into account social security's earnings112Ccjldwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
test, family benefit maxima, actuarial reductions and increases, benefit
recomputation, eligibility rules, ceiling on taxable earnings, and legislated
changes in normal retirement ages.
To summarize the paper's main findings: Americans born in the post-
war period will, under current law, lose roughly 5 cents of every dollar
they earn to the OASI program in taxes net of benefits. Out of every
dollar that postwar Americans contribute to the OASI system, 67 cents
represents a pure tax. The system treats women better than men, whites
better than non-whites, and the college-educated better than the non-
college-educated. While the system has been partially effective in pool-
ing risk across households, it offers postwar cohorts internal rates of
return on their contributions that are quite lowunder 2 percent. If
taxes are raised or benefits cut by the amounts needed, under intermedi-
ate assumptions, to achieve intertemporal budget balance in the OASI
program, postwar Americans wifi end up receiving a 1 percent real
return on their contributions and giving 7 cents of every dollar earned to
OASI in net taxes.
Measured as a proportion of their lifetime labor incomes, the middle
class are the biggest losers from social security, but measured in absolute
dollars, the rich lose the most. On average, postwar middle-class work-
ers pay about 7 cents per dollar earned to OASI in net taxes, compared to
0.7 cents for the lowest-paid workers and 4.3 cents for the highest-paid
workers. But in absolute terms, today's highest earners pay roughly
$625,000 measured as of age 65, compared to roughly $375,000 for to-
day's middle-class workers, and $40,000 for today's lowest earners.1
As an average, out of every dollar that postwar Americans contribute
to the OASI system, 67 cents represent a pure tax. The pure-tax compo-
nent of each dollar contributed is very similar across all postwar Ameri-
cans. The degree of pure OASI taxation is less than 50 cents on the dollar
for very low lifetime earners and greater than 75 cents on the dollar for
very high lifetime earners.
Men pay about 1 percent more of their lifetime earnings to OASI in net
taxes than do women. The higher male net tax rates obtain even control-
ling for lifetime earnings. They reflect shorter male life expectancy and
less frequent receipt of OASI dependent and survivor benefits. Non-
whites, because of their shorter life expectancies, face slightly higher
Our findings about the system's progressivity are sensitive to the assumed real discount
rate. We use a 5-percent rate for reasons discussed below. For lower discount rates, social
security appears more progressive when progressivity is measured in terms of net taxes
relative to lifetime labor income. Indeed, with a low enough discount rate, social security's
lifetime net rate rises with the level of lifetime income for postwar cohortsthe same finding
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(about a third of a percentage point) lifetime OASI net tax rates than do
whites. This is particularly true at lower levels of lifetime earnings.
College-educated workers face somewhat lower (about three-fifths of a
percentage point) lifetime OASI net tax rates than non-college-educated
workers, but this difference disappears once one controls for lifetime
earnings.
One rationale for the OASI program is that it pools earnings and
longevity risks through the progressivity of its benefit schedule as well
as through its provision of dependent and survivor benefits. The data
support this view. Across and within postwar cohorts, the OASI pro-
gram reduces the variance of lifetime income by about 6 percent.
We proceed in the next section with a brief discussion of social secu-
rity's long-term financial difficulties and their implications for the baby
boomers and their children. Section 3 briefly reviews the literature on
social security's inter- and intragenerational redistribution and clarifies
how this study breaks new ground. Sections 4 and 5 briefly describe the
CORSIM and socsimodels, respectively. A detailed description is pro-
vided in our NBER working paper (Caldwell et al., 1998). Section 6
summarizes our sample and our constructed data. Section 7 presents our
findings, and section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. SOCIAL SECURITY'S LONG-TERM
FINANCIAL CRISIS
As mentioned, under intermediate assumptions, a 4.7-percentage-point
immediate and permanent payroll tax increase is needed to pay for
projected benefits on an ongoing basis. Since the current tax rate is 12.4
percent, this would represent a 38-percent tax hike. The magnitude of
this tax adjustment is more than twice as large as the requisite tax hike
acknowledged in the Social Security Trustees Report.
The reason for the discrepancy is that the Trustees Report looks only 75
years into the future, whereas the calculation generating the 4.7 percent
requisite tax hike considers what is needed to maintain the system's
solvency on a perpetual basis. Although 75 years may appear to be a safe
enough projection horizon, social security is slated to run major deficits
in all years beyond this horizon. The Trustees Report's use of the 75-year
truncated projection period explains, in part, why social security's fi-
nances are again deeply troubled after having been "fixed" by the
Greenspan Commission in 1983. Each year that passes brings another
major deficit year within the 75-year projection window, and 15 years
have now passed since the Commission met.114Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
As painful as a 38-percent tax hike would be, even it would likely fall
short of what is really needed to sustain Social Security without cutting
benefits. The demographic and economic assumptions for the "interme-
diate" projections appear to be optimistic on at least two important
counts. First, they assume a slower growth in life span than the U.S. has
experienced in recent decades. Second, they assume higher future real
wage growth than recent experience would suggest.
The life expectancy for Americans born this year is 76 years. The
intermediate projection assumes that, over the next 45 years, life expec-
tancy wifi rise by only 3 years, to 79 years. Since this is Japan's current
life expectancy, the Social Security Administration would have us be-
lieve that it wifi take America another 45 years just to reach the current
Japanese life span. In assessing this prognosis, it's worth bearing in
mind that the last time U.S. life expectancy grew by 3 years, it took only
20 yearsfrom 1977 to the present.
Leading demographers, including Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997, 1998),
project much more rapid growth in life expectancy. Indeed, the mid-
range of Lee's projection indicates a 10-year, rather than a 5-year life-
span extension between now and 2070. This is twice the rise forecast
over this period by Social Security in its intermediate projection. Assum-
ing Lee is right, the requisite immediate and permanent OASDI tax hike
rises from 4.7 to 5.4 percentage points.
Since 1975, real wages have grown at only 0.4 percent/year, although
the growth rate in this decade has been almost twice as high. The inter-
mediate projection assumes a 0.9-percent/year growth rate in real wages
over the next 75 years. In conjunction with an extra 5 years of life-span
extension, lowering the real-wage growth assumption to 0.4 percent/
year would raise the needed tax hike to 5.9 percentage pointsa 48-
percent increase relative to its current value.
This 48-percentage-point hike in the payroll tax would leave the
OASDI tax rate permanently at 18.3 percent. But that's only if it were
enacted immediately. If the government waited, say, 10 years to raise tax
rates, it would have to raise the OASDI tax rate by another 0.8 percent-
age points to 19.1 percent to generate the same amount of tax revenue
present-valued to today. If it waited 20 years, the OASDI tax rate hike
would need to rise to over 20 percent.
There are additional factors, including fertility and net migration,
which could turn out worse than projected in the intermediate assump-
tions. Indeed, one can consider the actuaries' high-cost projection,
which assumes that all critical factors wifi be worse than those assumed
in the intermediate projection. Under the high-cost assumptions, which,
by the way, are very close to Lee with respect to life-span extension andSocial Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans115
assume 0.4 percent future real wage growth, we need a 7-percentage-
point OASDI tax rate hike, right now and forever, to pay for social
security's benefits on an ongoing basis. This would put the OASDI tax
rate at 19.4 percent.
Clearly, social security's finances are troubled. And clearly, it would
be mistaken to assess social security's treatment of postwar American
generations assuming no future change in current law. Indeed, the gov-
ernment is now actively debating such changes. But knowing precisely
what that change wifi be is, at this point, impossible. Still, the most likely
scenario seems to be the maintenance of the program through time,
albeit with either major tax hikes, benefit cuts, or both. To cover both of
these bases, we entertain below two alternative policies: an immediate
and permanent 38 percent increase in the OASI tax rate and an immedi-
ate and permanent 25 percent cut in Social Security benefits.
3. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S
LIFETIME NET BENEFITS
Past studies have calculated the value of social security's lifetime net
benefits for selected types of married couples and single individuals who
differ by age of birth, sex, race, and lifetime earnings patterns. These
studies include Nichols and Schreitmueller (1978), Pellechio and Good-
fellow (1983), Myers and Schobel (1993), Hurd and Shoven (1985),
Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, and Shoven (1987), Steuerle and Bakija (1994),
and Diamond and Gruber (1997). Like our paper, Coronado, Fullerton,
and Glass (this volume) represents a different approachnamely, con-
sidering the dispersion of all potential outcomes. But unlike our paper,
Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass examine actual data (from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics) rather than synthetic data. Their paper repre-
sents a real step forward in determining exactly how postwar Americans
are being treated.
Steuerle and Bakija's study is fairly representative of the past litera-
ture and may be the best known prior study. They consider three
alternative lifetime wage patterns: low, average, and high, where "low"
refers to 45 percent of the average value of social-security-covered earn-
ings, "average" refers to the average value of social-security-covered
earnings, and "high" refers to the value of the maximum taxable level
of social-security-covered earnings. For each cohort reaching age 65
between 1940 and 2050, Steuerle and Bakija calculate the lifetime net
benefits from social security for singles and married couples for alterna-
tive sets of these three lifetime wage patterns. For example, they con-116Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
sider married couples in which both spouses have low earnings, one
spouse has low earnings and the other average earnings, and one
spouse has average earnings and the other high earnings. Steuerle and
Bakija use their assumed earnings trajectories to compute retirement,
dependent, and survivor benefits. In the case of survivor benefits, the
authors consider all possible truncations of the earnings trajectories
resulting from all possible alternative dates of early death. Each of the
various state-contingent benefits is actuarially discounted to form a
lifetime net benefit.
Steuerle and Bakija's findings generally accord with those of previous
studies in showing that today's and tomorrow's workers wifi fare much
worse under social security than current and past retirees, that men are
disadvantaged relative to women, and that single individuals and two-
earner couples face higher net taxes than do single-earner couples. The
authors also claim that "for most of Social Security's history, the system
has been regressive within generations. That is, within a given cohort of
retirees, net transfers have been inversely related to need: people with
the highest lifetime incomes have tended to receive the largest absolute
transfers above and beyond what they contributed."
Steuerle and Bakija's study pays careful attention to detail and pro-
vides an impressive and extensive array of calculations. Yet, it raises five
concerns. First, in considering only uninterrupted earnings histories,
the study omits a potentially very important source of intra- and in-
tergenerational heterogeneity in lifetime social security net benefits. Sec-
ond, in assuming fixed lifetime marital status, the study ignores the role
of divorce and remarriage in altering social security net benefits. Third,
in assuming that receipt of social security retirement benefits starts at
workers' ages of normal retirement, the study ignores benefit reductions
for age, delayed retirement credits, benefit recomputation, and the earn-
ings testall of which can materially affect social security's lifetime net
benefits. Fourth, the study uses an extremely low real interest rate, just 2
percent, in discounting future net benefits. And fifth, in failing to con-
sider workers who earn above the taxable maximum, the study fails to
capture an important regressive element of the systemthe fact that for
very high-income single individuals and couples, social security's net
lifetime taxation is a smaller fraction of lifetime earnings than it is for
Steuerle and Bakija's "high" earners.
The fact is that essentially no Americans experience the kinds of
smooth and consistent earnings trajectories assumed by Steuerle and
Bakija and the other above-cited authors. To begin, there is considerable
variation across and within cohort members in work experience. At the
macro level we see periodic recessions, changes over time in the normalSocial Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans117
rate (what economists call the "natural rate") of unemployment, changes
in the duration of unemployment, changes in labor-force participation, a
strong and ongoing trend toward early retirement, significant changes
over time in fertility rates, and, particularly among the upper income
classes, a rise in the average age of first birth. Each of these macro
phenomena can materially alter the amount of time members of particu-
lar cohorts spend working over the course of their lifetimes. We also
know that particular members within each cohort are differentially af-
fected by these phenomena; i.e., we know that blacks experience much
higher unemployment rates in general than whites and that these differ-
ences are accentuated during downturns; we know thatfemale labor-
force participation has risen dramatically in the postwar period; we
know that males are retiring ever earlier, whereas females appear to be
retiring somewhat later; and we know that changes over time in fertility
rates and the age of first birth have altered the amount of time young
females spend working.
Even for workers continuously employed from age 21 through their
normal retirement agethe type of workers Steuerle and Bakija (1994)
and other studies considerone should expect considerable variation in
annual earnings due to variation in weeks worked per year and earnings
per week. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which is one of the
main panel data sets used to study annual earnings, suggests significant
year-to-year variation in annual earnings, even of those working full
time. Given that some of this variation may reflect measurement!
reporting error, there is still a very strong empirical basis for modeling
annual earnings variability.
The changing propensity of Americans to form and dissolve marriages
also provides a strong argument for a micro simulation approach to
studying social security's treatment of the population. Social security is
anything but neutral with respect to marital status. The system provides
dependent benefits to non-working spouses and secondary earning
spouses, provided the dependent spouse was married for at least 10
years with the living worker on whose earning record she or he wishes
to claim such benefits. Social security also provides survivor benefits to
spouses who are married for as little as 9 months provided the marriage
is ongoing at the time the decedent spouse dies or provided the marriage
had lasted for at least 10 years. In ignoring divorce and the timing of
when divorce occurs, the studies cited have left out a potentially rich
form of social security benefit variation.
By entertaining alternative ages of retirement and social security enti-
tlement ages (the age one elects to start collecting social security retire-
ment benefits), micro simulation lets us study how benefit reductions for118Ca/dwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
age, delayed retirement credits, benefit recomputation, and the earnings
test alter who gets what from social security. As detailed below, these
decisions and provisions influence not only the worker's own benefits,
but also the dependent and survivor benefits that are available under his
or her earnings record. For example, individuals who are married for 10
years are eligible to collect spousal dependent benefits at or beyond their
age of early retirement, but only if their spouses are themselves collect-
ing social security retirement benefits.
As mentioned, Steuerle and Bakija discount social security benefits
and taxes at a 2-percent real rate of return. In using such a low rate, they
bias upward their estimates of social security's net benefits for all con-
tributors. But they differentially bias upward their net benefit estimate
for those with longer life expectanciesin this case women.
Steuerle and Bakija justify their discount-rate choice as comparable to
average real interest rates over time for safe investments. To them "So-
cial Security is an extremely safe investment that is uniquely resistant to
economic fluctuations and inflation and receives favorable tax treat-
ment." Each of their rationales is troubled. First, the current real rate of
return on the only safe asset available in the economyinflation-
indexed Treasury bondsis roughly 3.5 percent, which is almost twice
Steuerle and Bakija's discount rate. Moreover, the maximum maturity of
these bonds is currently 10 years. It could well be that safe rates of return
for maturities beyond 10 years could exceed 3.5 percent. Second, social
security is a highly risky asset. It's risky with respect to demographic
change, the rate of real wage growth, and legislative changes instigated
by reform-minded politicians. The repeated number of changes over the
years to both tax and benefit provisions of social security as well as its
current dire long-term fiscal position attest to these risks. Third, the
system has a sorry history with respect to inflation. The double-digit
inflation in the early 1970s brought forth double indexation of benefits to
inflation. More recently, the CPI Commission reported that social secu-
rity's benefits are being significantly overindexed to inflation because of
mismeasurement of the CPI.
Finally, social security is not a capital asset, and the tax treatments of
social security contributions and social security benefits are not relevant
to deciding the rate of return at which these flows should be discounted.
What is relevant is the after-tax rate of return workers could otherwise
receive were they able to invest their contributions in real assets. The
opportunity to invest one's contributions in real assets would arise in the
context of a privatization of social security. If such a privatization relied
on an independent revenue source (e.g., a consumption tax) to pay off
benefits accrued under the old system, then workers would be able toSocial Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans119
invest at the economy-wide pre-tax rate of return.2 This study takes a 5-
percent real discount rate as its central assumption, but also shows re-
sults for 3- and 7-percent discount rates. The 5-percent figure can be
viewed as combining a 3.5-percent risk-free, pre-tax real rate with a 1.5-
percent premium that takes account of the riskiness of social security
benefits and taxes.
The use of a more realistic after-tax discount rate and our other meth-
odological choices lead to conclusions that, in many cases, differ from
those drawn by Steuerle and Bakija. First, Steuerle and Bakija suggest
that, in addition to most lower-income households, "many middle- and
upper-income households wifi continue to receive generous positive
transfers from Social Security far into the future" (Steuerle and Bakija,
1994, p. 112). We find much the opposite: net taxes for all postwar
generations are positive and very large at all levels of lifetime incomes.
Second, Steuerle and Bakija suggest that for most households net life-
time OASI tax rates wifi be negative and that "even in the worst case"
(op. cit., p.11s) this nex tax rate wifi not exceed 5.67 percent. In contrast,
we find that baby boomers, as a group, face a 5-percentlifetime net tax
rate and that those born after the boomers face a 7-percent rate. We also
show that these net tax rates wifi rise to 6 percent and 10 percent,
respectively, if OASI taxes are immediately raised by enough to make
the OASI system fiscally sustainable. Finally, Steuerle and Bakija (1994)
as well as Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (thisvolume) find that the
OASI system is progressive when one measures progressivity in terms
of lifetime net taxes relative to lifetime income. Although our results
accord with theirs assuming a very low discount rate,3 for the rate we
consider, the OASI system is not progressive; instead, for most postwar
cohorts, those with the highest level of lifetime income face the smallest
lifetime net tax rate.
4. CORSIM
CORSIM is a dynamic micro simulation model of the U.S. population
developed by Professor Steven Caldwell of Cornell University and his
associates.4 Micro simulation begins with a population sample and then
grows (ages) this population in discrete intervals, such as amonth or
2 To fully evaluate the net gains from privatization, one would also need to discount the
future value of any new taxes imposed to finance the privatization transition.
See Appendix Table 1 in Caidwell et al. (1998).
The model is a descendant of DYNASIM, which was developed in the 1970s by Professor
Guy Orcutt of Yale University, Professor Caldwell, and others at the Urban Institute.120Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
year. Through the aging process, one simulates life histories for each
sample member. Life histories refer to sample members' demographic,
economic, health, and social experiences. The simulation is generated by
a set of mathematical processes which combine deterministic (system-
atic) and stochastic (random) elements.5
4.1 Alignment to Macro Aggregates
Micro simulation models typically incorporate an alignment process in
which initial outcomes generated by the model's in part deterministic
and in part stochastic modules are benchmarked to historical aggregates.
These aggregates are typically group-specific, such as the average earn-
ings of white females ages 19 to 25 who are married with children in the
home and working part time. Benchmarking is performed by calculating
group-specific alignment factors, which are applied within each group to
the values of the sample member's predicted continuous variable (such
as earnings) and probabilities (such as the chance of divorcing). These
adjustment factors are then used in a second pass of the model through
the population.6
4.2 The CORSIM Model
CORSIM begins in 1960. Its initial population is the representative sam-
ple of Americans surveyed in the 1960 U.S. Census Public-Use Mi-
crodata Sample. This data set is a 1 : 1,000 sample, so one out of every
thousand Americans alive in 1960 is included. The Census survey pro-
vides much, but not all, of the information needed as baseline data.
The remaining information is imputed to the 1960 sample from a vari-
ety of sources.
CORSIM grows the 1960 sample demographically and economically in
one-year intervals through the year 2100. Demographic growth refers to
birth, death, and immigration, entry into the marriage market, family
formation, family dissolution, and the schooling attainment. Economic
The processes for continuous variables, such as income, are typically regression equa-
tions with a deterministic component that is based on the sample member's socioeconomic
characteristics and an error that is typically drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean and known variance. Discrete-state changes (e.g., the transition from urunarried to
married, from living to dead, or from not working to working) are generally modeled as
logistic functions.
For example, if the model generates fewer (more) than the expected number of births in a
given period, the fertility probabifities for women of childbearing age in the period are
scaled upward (downward). One can scale continuous variables in a simple linear fashion
or by using more complex non-linear methods (see, for example, Johnson, 1996, and
Neufeld, 1996a, 1996b).Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans121
growth refers to working or not working, choosing annual weeks
worked, and determining weekly labor earnings.7
As detailed in Caldwell et al. (1996), these and other CORSIM processes
are determined by over 1,000 distinct equations, hundreds of rule-based
algorithms, and over 5,000 parameters. Data used to estimate and test
the separate equation-based modules were drawn from large national
microdata files, including High School and Beyond (HSB), the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS), the National Longitudinal Survey of youth
(NLS-Y), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Lon-
gitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS), the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), and the U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Data
used to construct the rule-based modules and to compute alignment
factors are drawn from another six files plus miscellaneous sources.
5. SOCSIM
50051M is a highly detailed OASI benefit calculator developed by Eco-
nomic Security Planning, Inc. for use in its financial planning software
programESPlannerTM. 50051M calculates retirement, spousal, wid-
ow(er), mother, father, children, and divorcee benefits as well as OASI
taxes. It does so taking into account social security's earnings test, family
benefit maxima, actuarial reductions and increases, benefit recompu-
tation, eligibility rules, ceiling on taxable earnings, and legislated changes
in normal retirement ages.
Calculation of OASI benefits, the basics of which are described below,
is extremely complex. The Social Security Handbook describing the rules
governing these benefits runs over 500 pages. Even so, on many key
points, the Handbook is incomplete and misleading. This assessment is
shared by Social Security's senior actuaries, who were consulted repeat-
edly in preparing SOCSIM. Their assistance, which proved invaluable,
came in the form of both extensive discussions and the transmittal of
numerous, highly detailed benefit calculations. The Social Security actu-
aries also introduced us to their ANYPIA, which calculates PIAs. Unfortu-
nately, the ANYPIA program considers only one person at a time and
does not permit the calculation of multiple, interdependent benefits of
household members. Consequently, ANYPIA did not provide an alterna-
tive to developing SOCSIM, although we have used it, where possible, to
coRsIM's other economic processes include consumption expenditures; saving; federal,
state, and local income and property taxation; individual asset holdings; inheritance; and
disability.122Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
check SOCSIM'S accuracy. We refer readers to Caidwell et al. (1998) for a
detailed discussion of SOCSIM'S calculation of each of the various types of
social security benefits.
6. SAMPLE SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS
Our master sample was produced by running CORSIM from 1960 through
2100. From this master, we selected (1) all never married males and
females born between 1945 and 2000 who lived to at least age 15, (2) all
males born between 1945 and 2000 who married women born between
1945 and 2010 and lived to at least age 15, and (3) all females born
between 1945 and 2000 who married males born between 1945 and 2000
who lived to at least age 15. Selecting the sample in this manner omits (1)
males born between 1945 and 2000 who married females born either
before 1945 or after 2010 and (2) females born between 1945 and 2000
who married males born either before 1945 or after 2000. Thus, at the
early end of the sample we lose some males who married older females
and some females who married older males. At the late end of the
sample we lose some males who married very much younger females
and some females who married younger males.
Whatever bias this selection process introduces should be absent for
cohorts born in the central years of our sample. For these cohorts, we are
presumably omitting very few, if any, observations. Take those born in
1965. The males born in 1955 who are left out of the sample are those
who either married females 20 or more years older than themselves or
married females 45 or more years younger than themselves. Those fe-
males born in 1965 who are omitted from the sample either married
males 20 or more years older than themselves or married males 35 or
more years younger than themselves.
The tables presented below break the data down by multi-year co-
horts, lifetime earnings, sex, race, and education. With the exception of
cohort 95, all multi-year cohorts contain all sample observations born
during five consecutive years. Cohort 45 refers to all sample observa-
tions born in 1945 through 1949. Cohort 50 refers to all observations born
between 1950 and 1954. This definition of the multi-year cohorts prevails
except for cohort 95, which contains all sample observations born during
the six-year period 1995-2000. In discussing the results below, we use
the term cohort to refer to the multi-year cohort groups.
All reported averages in the tables are cell-specific. All lifetime vari-
ables are present values measured in 1997 dollars and calculated as of the
year the individual is age 18. Unless otherwise indicated, all present
values reflect discounting at a 5-percent real rate. The taxes and benefitsSocial Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans123
used in forming lifetime OASI taxes and benefits are those nominally
paid by the taxpayer and his employer and received by the beneficiary.
Thus, a dependent benefit paid to a husband is counted as his benefit,
notwithstanding the fact that the benefit is based on his wife's earnings
record.
Although the discounting we do here is simple, not actuarial, the
average cell values we report are averages over life span aswell as other
outcomes and, in that sense, represent actuarial averages. For example,
if we consider the lifetime net taxes paid by all males born between 1945
and 1949 within a certain range of realized lifetime income, the males in
this cell wifi live for different numbers of years, experience different
marital outcomes, have different numbers of children at different ages,
etc. By averaging the net taxes across all the males in these cells, we are
effectively producing the same result as if we considered all the possible
life spans and other experiences of each male, multiplied his net taxes
under each possible set of outcomes by the probability of that outcome,
summed across these products to form an actuarial net tax payment, and
then averaged these actuarial net tax payments across all males in the
cell.
6.1 The Number and Distribution of Observations
The total number of sample observations is 68,688 individuals. Table 1
gives sample counts, and Table 2 shows the distribution of observations
by levels of lifetime earnings. The choice of lifetime earnings brackets
was made to spread the observations across the different earningscells.
As Table 1 indicates, the observations are almost equally divided among
men and women. They are also fairly evenly distributed acrossthe 11
cohorts. Sixteen percent of the observations are non-white, and 41 per-
cent have one or more years of college education. These percentages
increase for successive cohorts. Eleven percent of cohort 45 is non-white,
compared with 21 percent of cohort 95. Thirty-one percent of cohort 45
observations have at least one year of college education, compared with
46 percent of cohort 95.
For the earliest (oldest) cohorts, most of the observations are concen-
trated among lifetime earnings groups below $500,000. But since CORSIM
takes into account historical as well as projected real wage growth, the
distribution of observations for later cohorts shifts toward higher labor
earnings. For example, in cohort 45 less than 7 percent of the observa-
tions have lifetime labor earnings in excess of $1.08 million, whereas in
cohort 95 almost 15 percent have earnings in that range.
In each cohort women are disproportionally represented among low
lifetime earners. For example, in cohort 80, 38 percent of women, but124Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 1
Number of Observations






















Cohort 45 14061030721514375240165120 873435001










Men 45 295396403340269196131 91 662752462
Men 50 433498459382279205160120 743152925
Men 55 560603556408275209155109 864573418
Men 60 535589430338228151116 97 874423013
Men 65 493529413298215190126 92 844192859
Men 70 500496378290218153126 87 744132735
Men 75 436488365293241146126 79 804072661
Men 80 502543453337250155121127 885633139
Men 85 475563389329260198143110 885753130
Men 90 5085474453232682041871101095933294
Men 95 4715864984002952361741631237533699
Women 45 1111634318174106 4434 29 21 682539
Women 50 1292759424215120 85 66 36 27 963120
Women 55 1420862487281166 91 68 73 371733658
Women 60 1348747399240155106 76 64 311873353
Women 65 1171667379211147103 74 61 33 1522998
Women 70 1098646377203140 91 70 39 34 1722870
Women 75 1080633388200134 96 83 62 31 1772884
Women 80 1222671368234181117 86 54 362213190
Women 85 1190746485288192120 92 66 392503468
Women 90 1190789451284190159 87 62 512753538
Women 95 1161832475310232136116 66 733343735
White 45 1279902623434331220153108 77 3214448
White 50 15391080749508348261191141 893735279
White 55 17371267901602377268205166114 5716208
White 60 162611507114923342251701441075485507
White 65 1428980650434318251177133105 5044980
White 70 1352921613422287215164112 905004676
White 75 1263891639407300205176117 864984582
White 80 1419991672472364225167146 976795232
White 85 136710587155193672561941511067015434
White 90 134510607074993742752211321347425489
White 95 128810727515564013012291941638935848Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans125
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
only 16 of men, have lifetime earnings below $120,000. At the other
earnings extreme, 18 percent of men, but only 10 percent of women,
have lifetime earnings of $1.08 million or more. Non-whites and non-
college-educated observations also have disproportionately low levels of
lifetime earnings. Take cohort 65. Overall, 62 percent of observations
have lifetime earnings below $480,000. But among non-whites, this per-





















Non-white 45 127128 9880 44 20 12 12 10 22553
Non-white 50 18617713489 51 29 35 15 12 38766
Non-white 55 24319814287 64 32 18 16 9 59868
Non-white 60 25718611886 49 32 22 17 11 81859
Non-white 65 236216142 75 44 42 23 20 12 67877
Non-white 70 246221142 71 71 29 32 14 18 85929
Non-white 75 25323011486 75 37 33 24 25 86963
Non-white 80 305223149 99 67 47 40 35271051097
Non-white 85 298251[5998 85 62 41 25 211241164
Non-white 90353276189108 84 88 53 40 26[261343
Non-white 95344346222154126 71 61 35 33 1941586
Non-college 451050758540352258129 97 67 52 1683471
Non-college 501233887601401242179124 86 55 2014009
Non-college 551402994688442281168134110 73 3254617
Non-college 601297843549356224144121 91 672883980
Non-college 651104758492297202168111 97 68 2683565
Non-college 701006679430264202117 9557 582473155
Non-college 75941661407268205104101 71 552553068
Non-college 801034695444310227147103 87 603103417
Non-college 851037746498335229153102 70 633513584
Non-college 901039775514321237180126 90 783643724
Non-college 951013835562355276187143 991054394014
College 45 356272181162[17111 68 53 35 1751530
College 50 492370282196157111102 70 462102036
College 55 578471355247160132 89 72 50 3052459
College 60 586493280222159113 71 70 51 3412386
College 65 560438300212[60125 89 56 49 3032292
College 70 592463325229156127101 69 503382450
College 75 575460346225170138108 70 563292477
College 80 690519377261204125104 94 644742912
College 85 628563376282223165133106 644743014
College 90 659561382286221183148 82 825043108
College 95 619583411355251185147130 916483420126Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 2
Distribution of Observatons






















Cohort 45 28.120.614.410.37.54.83.32.41.7 6.9100.0
Cohort 50 28.520.814.69.96.64.83.72.61.7 6.8100.0
Cohort 55 28.020.714.79.76.24.23.22.61.7 8.9100.0
Cohort 60 29.621.013.09.16.04.03.02.51.9 9.9100.0





Cohort 90 24.919.613.1 8.96.75.34.02.52.312.7100.0















Women 60 40.222.311.97.24.63.22.3 1.90.9 5.6100.0
Women 65 39.122.212.67.04.93.42.52.0 1.1 5.1100.0
Women 70 38.322.513.17.14.93.22.4 1.41.26.0100.0
Women 75 37.421.913.56.94.63.32.92.11.1 6.1100.0
Women 80 38.321.011.57.35.73.72.71.71.1 6.9100.0
Women 85 34.321.514.08.35.53.52.71.91.1 7.2100.0
Women 90 33.622.312.78.05.44.52.51.81.47.8100.0
Women 95 31.122.312.78.36.23.63.11.82.0 8.9100.0
White 45 28.820.314.09.87.44.93.42.41.7 7.2100.0
White 50 29.220.514.29.66.64.93.62.71.7 7.1100.0
White 55 28.020.414.59.76.14.33.32.71.8 9.2100.0
White 60 29.520.912.98.96.14.13.1 2.61.910.0100.0
White 65 28.719.713.18.76.45.03.62.72.110.1100.0
White 70 28.919.713.19.06.14.63.52.4 1.910.7100.0
White 75 27.619.413.98.96.54.53.82.6 1.910.9100.0
White 80 27.118.912.89.07.04.33.22.8 1.913.0100.0
White 85 25.219.513.29.66.84.73.62.82.012.9100.0
White 90 24.519.312.99.16.85.04.02.42.413.5100.0
White 95 22.018.312.89.56.95.13.93.32.815.3100.0Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans127
TABLE 2 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
6.2 Average Ages of Death
Since social security pays its benefits in the form of annuities, how long
one lives is a critical factor in determining howmuch one benefits from
the system. Table 3 reports the average ages of death for our sample. As
one would expect, later cohorts live longer,females outlive males,
whites outlive non-whites, and those with college education outlive
those without. The average age of death for the first five cohorts is 79.5,
compared with 81.1 for the last five. Across the entire sample, females



































Non-college 5530.421.514.99.66.13.62.92.4 1.6 7.0100.0
Non-college 6032.621.213.88.95.63.63.02.3 1.77.2100.0
















College 90 21.218.112.39.2 7.15.94.82.62.616.2100.0
College 95 18.117.012.010.47.35.44.33.82.718.9100.0128Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 3
Average Age of Death

































































White 95 80.580.680.481.481.882.582.081.680.781.581.0Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans129
TABLE 3 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
and latest cohorts by about one year. The gap between whites and non-
whites narrows for successive cohorts from about three years to about
two. The average gap between those with and without college education
is almost one and a half years.
There is also a strong correlation between lifetime earnings and aver-
age length of life. Part of this correlation runs from earnings to life span;
i.e., the mortality probabilities used in the CORSIM model are smaller at
higher levels of earnings. But part runs from life span to earnings. Those






















































College 95 81.080.380.181.883.082.483.781.980.881.581.3130Ca/dwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
for that reason, have lower lifetime earnings. The differences by lifetime
earnings levels in life span can be substantial. Cohort 80 is illustrative.
For men in this cohort the life-span gap between the highest and lowest
lifetime earnings groups is over 6 years for men and almost 3 years for
women.
7. FINDINGS
This section describes OASI's treatment of postwar Americans. First, it
shows OASI lifetime net tax rates. Second, it considers the degree to
which contributions made to OASI represent a pure tax. Third, it de-
scribes how lifetime net tax rates would rise in response to either an
immediate and permanent 4.0-percentage-point increase in the OASI
tax rate or an immediate and permanent 25-percent reduction in bene-
fits. Fourth, it considers the role of the OASI program in reducing the
riskiness of lifetime income. Finally, it examines the internal rates of
return being paid by the OASI program to postwar Americans on their
contributions.
7.1 OASI Lifetime Net Tax Rates
Table 4 reports OASI lifetime net tax rates computed as average net taxes
within each cell divided by average lifetime earnings in that cell. Bear in
mind that the table's entries are not average lifetime tax rates across cell
observations, but rather the average rate of net taxation applied to total
within-cell lifetime earnings.
As indicated in the introduction, Americans born between 1945 and
2000 will, under current law, pay about 5 percent of their lifetime earn-
ings in net taxes to the OASI program. The level of the net tax rate is
clearly sensitive to the choice of discount rate. Using a 3-percent dis-
count rate lowers lifetime net tax rates by close to 2 percentage points;
using a 5-percent discount rate raises lifetime net tax rates by over 1
percentage point. Net tax rates decrease with decreasing discount rate
because (1) most OASI benefits are received later than most OASI taxes
are paid and (2) the farther away receipt or payment is in time, the more
discounting reduces its present value.
7.2 Differences across Lifetime-Earnings Levels in OASI Lifetime
Net Tax Rates
A striking feature of Table 4's first block of numbers is the higher lifetime
net tax rates social security imposes on the middle class than on the poorSocial Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans131
or the super-rich. Take Cohort 80. Its members earningless than
$120,000 over their lifetimes face a -1.0-percent lifetime net tax rate.
Those earning $1.8 million or more face a 4.6-percent rate. In contrast,
those in the middle of the earnings distribution, earning from $480,000
to $600,000, face a 6.8-percent rate.
Compared to the net tax rates of those in the middle class, the rela-
tively low net tax rates faced by the poor reflect the significant prog-
ressivity of social security's PTA benefit formula. Offsetting this some-
what is the fact that individuals with lower lifetime incomes tend to die
at younger ages. For upper-income individuals (those in the top two
deciles), their relatively low lifetime net tax rates reflect the fact that only
a part of their earningsthe amount up tothe ceiling on taxable
earningsis subject to the OASI payroll tax.
In considering this regressive aspect of the OASI system, it's worth
bearing in mind that the super-rich pay, in absolute terms, much more
in net taxes than do members of the middle class. It's also important to
note that our calculations don't include the taxation of OASI benefits
under the federal income tax. Inclusion of these taxes would make social
security look more progressive.
7.3 Male and Female OASI Lifetime Net Tax Rates
Women generally have lower lifetime earnings than men. Conse-
quently, they are more likely than are men to receive dependent bene-
fits and survivor benefits based on their spouse's earnings record. In
addition, women live longer than men, permitting them to receive bene-
fits for more years. Both of these factors explain why Table 4's lifetime
net tax rates for men exceed those for women for each of the 11 cohorts.
The difference is significant. Across all cohorts, the lifetime net tax rate
faced by males is 1.1 percentage points higher than that faced by fe-
males. This, again, is based on a 5-percent discount rate. The male-
female differential is substantially larger if one discounts using a 3-
percent rate. In this case, the average difference across the 11 cohorts
exceeds 2 percentage points; using a 7-percent discount rate, the aver-
age difference is less than 0.5 percentage points.Thus depending on
one's view of the appropriate discount rate, postwar women are either
being treated much better than, better than, or about the same as post-
war men by the OASI system.
Male-female differences in lifetime net tax rates are largest and most
persistent at lower levels of lifetime income where the average lifespan
differences are largest and where females receive significant amounts of
dependent and survivor benefits relative to their own tax contributions.132Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 4
Average Lifetime OASI Net Tax Rates





































Men 65 4.46.16.97.57.47.37.7 7.57.44.6 5.9
Men 70 4.46.06.97.07.57.38.0 8.07.94.65.9
Men 75 4.05.86.77.17.27.57.68.08.14.65.9
Men 80 4.35.36.57.1 7.17.47.27.87.65.05.8
Men 85 3.45.16.46.86.96.97.47.88.14.45.4






Women 65 -1.84.35.56.76.56.77.37.4 7.03.94.9
Women 70 -2.03.95.66.36.66.97.37.36.53.74.6














White 90 -2.03.85.3 6.36.86.87.07.17.64.75.3
White 95 -2.23.45.1 6.06.36.36.67.27.34.85.2Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans133
TABLE 4 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
Take cohort 95: For males earning below $120,000, the net tax rate equals
3.8 percent, compared with -2.6 percent for females.
7.4 Lifetime Net Tax Rates of Whites and Non-Whites
Lifetime net tax rates for non-whites generally exceed those for whites
for each of the 11 cohorts and 10 lifetime earnings brackets. Across all
cohorts, the lifetime net tax rate of non-whites is 0.4 percentage points
higher than that of whites. This difference arises primarily because of















































College 60 -1.04.86.1 7.27.17.17.67.07.13.64.8
College 65 -0.65.06.1 6.97.06.97.46.86.94.15.2
College 70 -0.34.55.96.47.17.17.97.77.64.1 5.1
College 75 -1.44.36.06.96.86.87.27.27.74.3 5.2
College 80 -1.84.15.7 6.96.67.37.17.67.24.4 5.1
College 85 -1.83.65.46.36.56.87.07.37.84.25.0
College 90 -2.63.85.56.26.56.87.06.87.44.4 5.1
College 95 -3.43.55.35.96.16.06.47.07.44.65.0134Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
7.5 OASI Lifetime Net Tax Rates of the College- and Non-
College -Educated
Those with less education are relatively disadvantaged by social security
on two counts. First, less education means a shorter life expectancy,
which, other things equal, means fewer years of collecting social security
benefits. Second, less education generally means earlier entrance into and
earlier exit from the labor market. Since social security doesn't credit
contributors for making their contributions earlier in time, these tax contri-
butions wifi have a larger present value than were the same annual contri-
butions made later in life. As Table 4 makes clear, college-educated cohort
members face lower lifetime net tax rates than do non-college-educated
cohort members for each of the 11 cohorts. On average, the difference in
net tax rates is 0.6 percentage points.
7.6 OASI's Effective Degree of Taxation
Another way to assess OASI's treatment of postwar Americans is to ask
what fraction of its payroll taxes are actually taxes. We compute this
degree of taxation by forming the ratio within each cell of net taxes to
gross taxes. Table 5 presents the results. It shows that for each succes-
sive cohort a larger share of OASI contributions represents pure taxes
rather than the purchase of a future benefit. On average, of every dollar
contributed to OASI, 67 cents represents a pure tax.
A quick glance through the table shows that the pure-tax component
of the OASI payroll contribution increases with lifetime earnings. As
we've seen, the pure-tax component is negative for the lowest lifetime-
earnings class. For the highest lifetime-earnings class, 79 cents of every
dollar contributed to OASI is a pure tax. The degree of pure taxation is
also substantially higher for men than for women, somewhat higher for
non-whites than for whites, and somewhat higher for the college-
educated than the non-college-educated.
7.7 Lifetime Net Tax Rates after Two Alternative Responses to
OASI's Long-Term Funding Crisis
As mentioned in section 1, social security faces a severe long-term financ-
ing crisis. Since no one knows how the imbalance wifi be corrected, it's
worthwhile considering OASI's lifetime net taxation of postwar Ameri-
cans under alternative adjustment scenarios. Table 6 displays lifetime
OASI net tax rates assuming the current 10.6-percent OASI tax rate is
raised immediately and permanently by 37.9 percent, which is the ratio of
the 4.7-percentage-point tax rate hike needed for permanent OASDI bal-Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans135
ance under the intermediate assumptions to the current12.4-percentage-
point OASDI tax rate. This policy leaves the OASI tax rate at 14.6 percent.
Although the new OASI tax rate is 4.2 percentage points higher than
the current rate, the lifetime net tax rates of all postwar Americans don't
rise by this amount. The reasons are that (1) many postwar Americans
already have much of their lifetime earnings behind them and the tax
hike would not be imposed retroactively, and (2) those earning above
social security's ceiling on taxable earnings experience a 4.2 percent
higher rate of taxation only on their OASI-taxable earnings.
Table 6 shows a dramatic worsening, because of this policy, in the
treatment of today's children compared to the baby boomers. For the
oldest boomers, cohort 45, the OASI tax hike would raise their own
lifetime net tax rate by 0.3 percent. For cohort 95, on the other hand, the
average net tax rate rises by 3.1 percentage points; i.e.,the oldest boom-
ers end up giving social security 0.3 percent moreof their lifetime in-
comes, whereas today's newborns end up givingsocial security over 3.1
percent more of their lifetime incomes.
The table also shows a significant increase in the lifetime net tax rates
of the poor and middle class within each cohort relative to the rich. For
cohort 95 the net tax rate of the lowest earners rises by 3.8 percentage
points, and the net tax rate of those earning $600,000 to $720,000 on a
lifetime basis also rises by 3.8 percentage points, whereas for the highest
lifetime earners in this cohort the rise is 2.3 percentage points. Since
men, whites, and the college-educated aredisproportionately high earn-
ers, the tax hike raises net tax rates somewhat morefor women, non-
whites, and the non-college-educated.
Table 7 shows the lifetime net tax rates that would arise if OASI
benefits were permanently cut by 25 percent starting in 1998. Unlike the
previous policy, which disproportionately hurt later cohorts, this policy
raises the net tax rates of almost all cohorts to about 6 percent. Although,
in absolute terms, the lifetime rich lose more in benefits than do the
poor, these benefits are a much smaller proportion oftheir lifetime earn-
ings. So the poor are disproportionately hurt. For example, in cohort 95,
the lifetime net tax rate of the lowest earners is 1.2 percentup 3.0
percentage points from the case of no benefit cuts. In contrast, the top
earners in cohort 95 experience only a 0.4-percent increase intheir life-
time net tax rates. Women also experience a disproportionately large
increase in their lifetime net tax rates. As an example, compare the 3.4-
percentage-point rise in the lifetime net tax rate of the poorest women in
cohort 95 with the corresponding 2.0-percentage-point rise of the poor-
est men in cohort 95.136Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 5
Average Wealth Tax Rates






















Cohort 45 3.47 53.28 67.05 70.6173.71 75.72 76.88 75.34 77.60 77.20 67.59
Cohort 50-26.22 46.35 61.26 67.6870.62 74.54 76.04 76.79 77.60 76.09 64.58
Cohort 55 -9.75 48.3162.48 67.2970.36 75.23 77.78 77.98 78.33 78.05 67.03
Cohort 60 -0.98 51.24 63.52 70.2671.37 73.61 77.41 78.73 79.98 78.64 68.47
Cohort 65 1.06 49.97 61.27 69.7970.99 72.95 74.64 75.55 79.69 80.18 68.63
Cohort 70 0.93 46.66 60.48 66.4970.57 71.81 75.41 79.06 77.97 79.79 67.94
Cohort 75 -3.30 45.08 59.98 66.3968.40 70.07 73.59 74.61 78.97 79.49 67.35
Cohort 80 -9.44 44.24 57.80 65.2067.69 70.57 70.54 75.24 77.74 79.43 67.47
Cohort 85-12.13 40.98 55.36 61.8266.03 68.79 69.75 74.32 77.09 78.42 66.04
Cohort 90-12.35 39.59 54.43 62.2866.35 68.66 70.75 71.62 75.37 77.61 65.83
Cohort 95-18.17 37.01 52.67 59.6764.04 64.27 67.29 71.66 74.78 78.88 66.19
Men 45 45.08 64.52 72.91 74.3876.26 77.25 78.26 77.27 79.79 78.88 75.55
Men 50 39.84 60.11 68.09 71.8173.25 76.40 78.36 78.58 78.47 77.35 73.41
Men 55 42.23 60.71 68.15 71.7972.59 77.61 80.32 80.63 79.43 79.09 74.47
Men 60 42.02 62.40 69.39 73.4774.07 75.66 80.79 81.37 80.98 79.42 75.16
Men 65 42.84 59.83 68.20 72.9474.66 75.39 75.20 76.5180.69 81.51 75.16
Men 70 43.57 57.88 66.42 69.8773.43 73.20 77.11 80.16 79.31 80.9174.42
Men 75 40.64 55.47 66.30 69.7470.84 73.75 76.65 78.30 80.53 80.74 74.06
Men 80 42.03 53.42 63.66 69.6070.56 73.49 71.50 76.42 78.38 80.65 73.78
Men 85 33.47 50.42 62.03 65.9368.60 70.18 73.25 76.36 79.56 79.29 72.43
Men 90 27.90 47.71 60.74 66.7867.32 70.64 70.66 73.57 76.43 78.43 71.39
Men 95 19.22 44.74 57.40 60.5767.64 64.90 68.2172.05 74.81 79.40 70.84
Women 45-4.81 46.40 59.63 62.7266.80 68.41 71.56 68.99 68.15 69.04 51.73
Women 50-49.48 36.76 53.37 60.0864.38 70.05 69.71 70.60 75.27 71.90 48.64
Women 55-32.25 39.12 55.87 60.4266.46 69.48 71.78 73.50 75.42 75.24 54.80
Women 60-20.21 42.28 56.96 65.6467.16 70.62 71.68 74.70 77.08 76.74 58.33
Women 65-17.16 42.11 53.68 65.3965.55 68.54 73.65 74.14 77.12 76.40 58.23
Women 70-20.04 37.78 54.54 61.6865.97 69.38 72.32 76.50 74.62 77.08 57.67
Women 75-22.28 36.71 54.04 61.3064.02 64.12 68.67 69.65 74.80 76.52 56.98
Women 80-32.32 36.91 50.44 58.8163.70 66.74 69.17 72.42 76.14 76.21 56.95
Women 85-30.44 33.72 49.90 57.0062.56 66.56 64.07 70.68 70.75 76.31 56.26
Women 90-28.78 33.94 48.30 57.1064.96 66.12 70.95 68.01 72.94 75.76 57.31
Women 95-32.35 31.31 47.67 58.5159.41 63.19 65.87 70.64 74.72 77.63 58.60
White 45 2.54 53.13 66.23 70.9573.58 76.24 76.88 74.98 76.83 77.38 67.50
White 50 -28.90 45.14 60.65 67.7870.4174.64 75.99 76.97 77.88 75.94 64.29
White 55 -11.44 47.29 61.94 67.4369.79 75.18 77.66 77.34 77.95 78.31 66.99
White 60 -3.23 50.26 62.64 70.0371.55 73.68 77.61 78.46 80.29 78.61 68.34
White 65 -1.91 48.55 61.65 69.8671.23 72.53 74.45 75.69 80.66 80.27 68.77
White 70 -2.15 45.26 59.79 66.1370.58 71.5175.84 79.87 77.45 80.12 67.95
White 75 -2.61 44.05 59.57 66.1367.92 70.1172.94 74.2178.61 79.82 67.35
White 80 -13.27 43.06 57.36 64.9367.70 70.47 70.60 74.84 78.32 79.40 67.40
White 85 -14.73 38.77 54.10 61.0666.07 68.67 69.46 74.68 76.68 78.68 65.95
White 90 -19.68 36.96 53.10 61.6566.87 68.13 70.18 71.97 75.04 77.40 65.59
White 95 -21.39 33.28 50.53 58.3662.96 63.45 67.03 71.57 74.11 78.48 65.58Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans137
TABLE 5 (cont.)






















Non-white 4513.72 54.41 72.40 68.7374.74 69.83 76.80 78.40 83.03 74.74 68.36
Non-white 50 -3.94 53.60 64.67 67.1271.95 73.68 76.33 75.26 75.66 77.54 66.59
Non-white 552.24 54.60 65.80 66.3373.71 75.64 79.03 84.84 82.59 75.41 67.33
Non-white 6012.48 57.34 68.66 71.6470.27 73.08 75.68 80.86 76.90 78.83 69.37
Non-white 6517.81 56.51 59.55 69.4269.39 75.43 76.06 74.64 69.28 79.53 67.77
Non-white 7016.53 52.47 63.42 68.7070.51 74.00 73.30 72.84 80.7177.82 67.92
Non-white 75-6.62 49.04 62.22 67.6170.31 69.85 76.90 76.53 80.23 77.63 67.39
Non-white 807.10 49.41 59.86 66.5267.65 71.05 70.30 77.05 75.84 79.61 67.82
Non-white 85-0.90 50.00 60.94 65.7065.86 69.32 71.10 72.17 79.03 76.89 66.48
Non-white 9012.45 49.15 59.38 65.3563.90 70.38 73.12 70.28 77.13 78.91 66.93
Non-white 95-5.03 48.21 59.91 64.5067.43 67.70 68.24 72.12 78.05 80.71 68.65
Non-college 5.30 55.97 68.32 71.9873.80 74.90 76.55 74.51 79.60 76.15 66.91
45
Non-college-23.05 48.72 62.25 68.8271.36 74.19 75.64 77.49 78.61 76.68 63.79
50
Non-college-4.37 49.96 62.51 66.908 69.63 76.85 78.78 77.81 79.76 78.56 66.41
55
Non-college 3.22 53.02 65.74 70.1371.97 74.26 76.40 79.92 82.37 79.11 68.09
60
Non-college 4.74 50.49 61.92 71.1570.54 73.41 75.49 76.93 80.62 80.74 68.23
65
Non-college 3.12 48.40 62.88 68.3370.92 71.82 73.64 80.33 77.96 79.67 66.97
70
Non-college 3.03 47.40 60.77 65.7269.45 72.18 73.82 75.25 79.22 80.96 66.98
75
Non-college-4.33 46.66 59.38 64.9269.60 69.13 71.49 74.45 78.55 80.10 66.45
80
Non-college-8.61 44.36 57.80 62.1467.30 68.95 70.01 74.43 75.83 78.92 65.09
85
Non-college-4.56 41.00 54.62 63.2366.67 69.00 72.59 73.48 75.26 77.34 64.69
90
Non-college-8.71 38.65 52.97 61.9567.04 66.61 69.68 72.27 75.79 79.71 65.59
95
College 45 -1.56 45.80 63.13 67.6573.51 76.61 77.35 76.38 74.40 78.18 68.76
College 50-34.74 40.43 59.09 65.2369.49 75.13 76.52 75.91 76.47 75.48 65.84
College 55-23.64 44.81 62.43 67.8671.66 73.11 76.22 78.26 76.07 77.50 68.00
College 60-10.29 48.18 59.28 70.4870.54 72.76 79.21 77.07 76.74 78.23 68.97
College 65 -6.10 49.09 60.19 67.8871.57 72.32 73.57 72.93 78.32 79.67 69.16
College 70 -2.58 44.11 57.27 64.3570.11 71.80 77.07 77.99 77.99 79.88 68.93
College 75-14.28 41.74 59.05 67.1767.13 68.45 73.37 73.93 78.73 78.35 67.73
College 80-17.13 40.94 55.97 65.5165.59 72.25 69.64 75.99 76.94 78.99 68.40
College 85-17.89 36.44 52.20 61.4364.75 68.64 69.55 74.25 78.31 78.05 66.92
College 90-25.19 37.64 54.19 61.2065.98 68.33 69.21 69.66 75.49 77.81 66.92
College 95-34.41 34.60 52.25 57.4460.78 61.76 64.89 71.16 73.66 78.32 66.74138Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 6
Average Lifetime OASI Net Tax Rates Assuming a 38% Tax Rate
Increase Beginning in 1999






















Cohort 45 0.75.8 7.07.27.57.57.26.36.43.95.8
Cohort 50 -1.84.6 6.16.67.07.37.37.06.84.05.4
Cohort 55 -0.15.4 6.97.37.68.18.48.37.64.55.9
Cohort 60 1.16.3 7.88.48.58.89.18.89.04.66.3
Cohort 65 1.86.9 8.29.19.09.09.79.59.25.57.1
Cohort 70 2.47.3 9.09.39.99.910.610.610.25.77.5
Cohort 75 2.87.9 9.510.110.410.410.510.811.36.48.1
Cohort 80 2.98.3 9.710.510.611.010.811.411.26.88.4
Cohort 85 2.67.9 9.510.210.510.610.811.111.36.58.0
Cohort 90 2.67.9 9.310.210.510.610.810.511.47.1 8.4
Cohort 95 2.07.6 9.210.010.210.210.511.111.07.3 8.4
Men 45 5.26.6 7.57.67.97.77.36.57.14.26.3
Men 50 4.36.0 6.97.17.37.57.77.26.94.16.0
Men 55 5.07.0 7.58.08.08.58.89.08.04.66.4
Men 60 5.77.6 8.78.89.19.29.89.29.34.66.7
Men 65 6.38.2 9.19.69.59.310.09.69.45.77.5




Men 90 6.78.7 9.910.710.710.810.810.911.87.28.7
Men 95 5.78.59.710.010.610.210.711.411.07.48.6
Women 45 -0.35.2 6.36.36.66.56.95.64.52.94.8
Women 50 -3.83.75.25.86.37.06.36.36.63.74.3
Women 55 -2.24.4 6.26.46.97.37.67.36.74.35.1
Women 60 -0.95.3 6.87.77.78.27.98.38.24.55.7
Women 65 -0.25.9 7.38.58.28.59.29.38.74.96.4
Women 70 0.26.2 8.18.79.19.49.99.98.94.96.6
Women 75 0.76.9 8.89.310.09.49.710.010.46.07.4
Women 80 0.57.6 8.89.710.110.710.510.910.95.87.5
Women 85 0.87.2 8.99.610.210.610.010.39.76.27.7
Women 90 0.97.3 8.89.610.310.310.79.910.56.77.9
Women 95 0.67.0 8.69.99.710.210.210.511.17.08.0
White 45 0.65.8 6.97.37.57.57.36.26.33.95.7
White 50 -2.04.5 6.06.66.97.37.37.06.84.05.4
White 55 -0.25.3 6.87.37.58.18.48.37.54.45.9
White 60 0.96.2 7.78.48.58.79.28.89.14.66.3
White 65 1.56.8 8.29.18.99.09.69.59.45.47.0
White 70 2.17.2 8.89.39.99.910.510.710.25.87.5




White 95 1.77.29.09.910.010.010.411.011.07.28.2Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans139
TABLE 6 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
7.8 How Well Does OASI Pool Risk?
If the OASI program represents a net tax, on average, for postwar Ameri-
cans, how well does it do in pooling risks these Americansface? Table 8
attempts to address this question. It compares the variance of lifetime
earnings before OASI taxes and benefits with the variance of lifetime
earnings net of OASI's lifetime net taxation. Specifically, within each cell
indicated in the table, we calculate the percentage difference between
the variance of lifetime earnings (a) and the variance of lifetime earnings






















Non-white 45 1.55.6 7.36.87.76.86.66.97.44.0 6.1
Non-white 50 0.05.3 6.56.67.67.67.07.26.94.45.9
Non-white 55 0.96.1 7.47.28.18.38.88.68.94.96.5
Non-white 60 2.57.0 8.48.38.99.07.89.68.34.16.2
Non-white 65 3.67.6 8.19.39.69.210.39.47.05.97.5
Non-white 70 4.08.1 9.59.29.8[0.110.610.210.15.47.5
Non-white 75 2.78.6 9.910.510.910.711.311.211.47.18.9
Non-white 80 4.79.0 9.710.510.511.311.210.911.88.19.4
Non-white 85 3.88.910.210.810.310.311.110.812.26.98.7
Non-white 90 5.29.0 9.910.19.910.611.09.411.47.08.6
Non-white 95 3.38.9 9.910.310.710.710.811.611.38.19.2
Non-college 450.96.0 7.27.37.57.27.26.16.84.16.0
Non-college 50-1.54.9 6.36.87.17.47.27.16.74.45.7









College 45 0.15.0 6.46.87.47.87.36.55.93.85.4
College 50 -2.53.9 5.76.26.9 7.27.36.86.93.75.1
College 55 -1.45.1 6.87.37.77.88.18.27.14.25.5
College 60 0.05.9 7.48.68.58.59.08.48.54.25.8
College 65 1.06.7 8.08.88.98.79.58.88.75.26.6
College 70 2.07.0 8.69.09.99.810.810.510.35.47.1
College 75 1.57.6 9.310.410.310.110.610.411.16.17.8
College 80 2.17.9 9.510.910.411.211.011.410.86.58.0
College 85 2.07.49.310.210.310.610.811.011.56.37.8
College 90 1.37.79.310.010.210.610.810.611.16.67.9
College 95 0.37.3 9.19.89.99.610.110.811.26.87.8140Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 7
Average Lifetime OASI Net Tax Rates Assuming a 25% Reduction in
Social Security Benefits Beginning in 1999
































Cohort 95 1.25.46.67.27.37.37.58.07.95.3 6.0
Men 45 6.27.27.97.98.17.97.46.67.14.26.4
Men 50 4.96.37.1 7.17.37.47.57.06.74.06.0






























White 95 0.95.06.47.17.27.27.57.97.95.25.9Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans141
TABLE 7 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
reports the percentage reduction calculated as (a-b)/a. The rows labeled
"Total" show variance reductions across all cohorts.
Across all cohorts, the OASI system reduces lifetime income variance
by 5.9 percent. The variance reduction is higher (7.0 percent) among the
non-college-educated, and smaller (5.1 percent) among the college-
educated. The reductions in variance among women and among men
are fairly similar. There is also no clear time trend acrosscohorts in the
degree of lifetime-income variance reduction.






















































College 95 -0.15.16.57.17.16.97.27.88.14.95.6142Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 8
Percentage Reduction in Variance of Lifetime Income
Group Total College Non-college
Total 5.9 5.1 7.0
Cohort 45 6.8 5.5 8.1
Cohort 50 6.3 5.5 7.1
Cohort 55 6.1 5.4 6.8
Cohort 60 5.3 4.2 7.4
Cohort 65 6.3 5.9 6.6
Cohort 70 5.3 4.3 7.3
Cohort 75 6.3 5.8 6.9
Cohort 80 5.4 5.4 5.3
Cohort 85 5.4 5.0 5.7
Cohort 90 6.4 5.5 7.9
Cohort 95 6.0 4.9 9.0
Total 5.6 4.9 6.8
Men 45 5.9 4.6 7.3
Men 50 5.8 4.3 8.1
Men 55 5.7 4.4 7.7
Men 60 4.8 3.7 6.4
Men 65 6.0 5.4 6.7
Men 70 6.2 5.5 7.0
Men 75 6.2 5.2 8.0
Men 80 5.2 5.6 4.6
Men 85 4.9 4.2 5.9
Men 90 6.0 5.3 6.9
Men 95 6.1 5.0 9.0
Total 5.5 4.9 6.5
Women 45 6.3 4.8 7.5
Women 50 5.8 7.2 5.2
Women 55 5.7 6.7 5.2
Women 60 5.7 4.3 8.5
Women 65 6.0 6.0 5.9
Women 70 4.0 3.1 6.9
Women 75 5.8 6.3 5.3
Women 80 5.1 4.6 6.0
Women 85 5.7 6.3 5.1
Women 90 6.5 5.4 9.4
Women 95 5.5 4.3 8.5
Total 5.81 5.15 6.79
White 45 6.62 5.38 7.96
White 50 6.17 5.46 6.91
White 55 5.89 5.25 6.54
White 60 5.67 4.62 7.26
White 65 6.07 5.78 6.34
White 70 6.13 5.50 7.10ance reductions, although small, are nottrivial. Second, the OASI sys-
tem appears successful in reducing lifetime-income variance acrossand
within cohorts and, indeed, within all subgroups of cohorts considered.
Third, although the OASI system reduces the variance of lifetime in-
come, this doesn't necessarily mean that itreduces the riskiness of life-
time income. If all agents knew for sure what they would earn, howlong
they would earn it, and when they would die, lifetime income would be
known with certainty; i.e., there would be no risks to pooi. Nonetheless,
the OASI system could reduce the variance of lifetime income by redis-
tributing from those with high to those with low lifetime incomes. A
counterargument here, however, is that even if people know their life-
time earnings once they are in the work force, they don't know them
before they are born, and the OASI system is reducing the risk of being
born a low lifetime earner.
7.9 Internal Rates of Return on OASI Contributions Earnedby
Postwar Americans
Table 9 presents calculations of the real internal rate of return projected
to be earned by postwar Americans on their OASI contributions.We
calculate this rate by determining the discount rate that equates the
Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans143
TABLE 8 (cont.)
Group Total College Non-college
White 75 6.15 5.69 6.75
White 80 5.04 5.08 4.94
White 85 5.22 4.91 5.60
White 90 6.40 5.42 8.64
White 95 5.68 4.58 8.97
Total 6.29 5.15 8.19
Non-white 45 8.77 8.05 9.72
Non-white 50 8.26 6.72 9.41
Non-white 55 8.54 6.81 10.69
Non-white 60 3.76 2.70 8.52
Non-white 65 8.47 7.29 10.11
Non-white 70 2.83 1.76 8.34
Non-white 75 7.24 6.67 7.93
Non-white 80 9.42 8.23 12.98
Non-white 85 6.42 6.00 6.99
Non-white 90 6.19 6.63 5.86
Non-white 95 8.82 8.58 9.06144Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
TABLE 9
Internal Rates of Return




























Cohort 75 5.093.382.481.951.731.61 1.201.120.470.521.87





Men 50 3.452.271.551.211.080.64 0.350.210.270.480.99







Men 90 4.083.122.211.771.741.38 1.411.120.700.481.32
Men 95 4.373.232.442.161.621.871.541.200.810.251.29
Women 45 5.113.422.632.241.841.801.471.631.811.523.06
Women 50 6.063.772.892.452.151.61 1.651.411.161.313.15
Women 55 5.733.692.772.502.001.731.501.211.090.992.82


















White 95 5.523.893.022.482.172.101.771.331.010.471.92Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans145
TABLE 9 (cont.)
Lifetime labor earnings in thousands of 1997 dollars:
present value of all benefits received by members of a particular cell to
the present value of all contributions paid by members of that cell.
On average, the real rate of return being paid to postwar Americans
on their social security contributions is verysmall-1.86 percent. This is
half the real rate currently being paid on inflation-indexed long-term
U.S. government bonds. Interestingly, there is no trend across the co-
horts with respect to the rates of return they earn. In other words, under
current law, the deal social security is offering current middle-aged






















































College 95 5.773.852.952.562.362.21 1.981.411.100.491.83146Caidwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, & Kotlikoff
cans. On the one hand, earlier cohorts experienced lower OASI tax rates
over the early parts of their working lives than do later cohorts. On the
other hand, later cohorts have greater longevity, reflecting the trends
incorporated in CORSIM's mortality module. In evaluating these figures,
one should also bear in mind that the observed differences may reflect
sampling variability.
In contrast to the cross-cohort and cross-assumption comparisons,
there are very marked differences in real rates of return across lifetime
income levels. Across all cohorts, those in the lowest earnings groupearn
on average a 5.19-percent return, whereas those in the highest earnings
group average a 0.54-percent return. On this metric, at least, the OASI
system appears to be highly progressive. There is also a systematic and
significant difference in rates of return earned by women and by men.
Across all cohorts and under the intermediate assumptions, womenearn,
on average, 2.79 percent on their contributions, whereas men earn only
1.05 percent. This difference reflects three things. First, women live
longer than men. Second, women are lower lifetime earners thanare men
and thus benefit more from social security's progressive OASI benefit
formula. Third, we are allocating dependent, mother and father, child,
and survivor benefits to the recipients of these benefits even though these
benefits are based on the earnings record of one's spouse.
Non-whites average about a 15 basis point lower rate of return than do
whites, reflecting their shorter life spans. Non-whitewhite differences
are somewhat greater among low lifetime earners, where mortality differ-
ences are greatest. Table 9 also indicates a slightly higher internal rate of
return for non-college-educated than for college-educated postwar Ameri-
cans. This is expected given the fact that the non-college-educated are
lower lifetime earners and thus benefit, relatively speaking, from social
security's progressive benefit formula.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has used CORSIM (a dynamic micro simulation model) and
SOCSIM (a detailed social security benefit calculator) to study social secu-
rity's treatment of postwar Americans through its OASI program. This
treatment is measured in terms of (1) the net taxes (gross taxes minus
gross benefits) individuals pay to social security over their lifetimes and
(2) the internal rates of return they earn on their contributions. Social
security represents a substantial net tax for all but the poorest postwar
Americans. It also provides almost all postwar Americans witha very
low rate of return on their contributionsabout half of what they could
earn by investing in inflation-indexed long-term government bonds.Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans147
Although social security hits the rich the hardest in absolute terms, it
hits them lightly in relative terms. The lifetime OASI net tax ratefacing
the top earners is substantially lower than that faced by the middle class.
The OASI system also favors women over men, whites over non-whites,
and the college-educated over the non-college-educated. The OASI sys-
tem's generally high lifetime net tax rates and low internal rates of return
should be set against its role in reducing, albeit by a small amount, the
variance in lifetime incomes as well as its role in redistributing to earlier
cohorts of Americans.
However one evaluates the current OASI system's treatment of post-
war Americans, one thing is clear. That treatmentwifi get significantly
worse once the government takes the rather severe stepsneeded to
shore up the system's long-term finances. The precise size of the bur-
den ultimately imposed on postwar Americans wifi depend on how
fast the government acts and whether it asks pre- as well as postwar
Americans to help solve social security's truly grave long-term financial
problems.
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